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A vast literature shows that China’s five largest state-owned banks (the Big Five) suffer from 
low cost efficiency. We offer a new explanation of this situation, by decomposing overall 
efficiency of Chinese banks into two parts: persistent and transient efficiency. Using the 
model of Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker (2014) based on the stochastic frontier approach, we 
measure persistent and transient efficiency for a large sample of 166 Chinese banks over the 
period 2008–2015. We show that the lower efficiency of China’s Big Five banks is almost 
entirely due to low persistent cost efficiency, indicating structural problems. On the contrary, 
the Big Five banks transient efficiency is similar to other Chinese banks, reflecting a good 
aptitude to minimize their costs in the short-term. Our findings support the view that major 
structural reforms are needed to enhance the efficiency of China’s Big Five banks. 
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The Chinese financial system is primarily based on banks, so the efficiency of its banks 
has substantial implications for the overall efficiency of the financial system. The cost 
efficiency of banks is a measure of the ability of banks to produce a certain level of output at a 
minimal cost. The lower the cost, the greater the efficiency. Higher efficiency, in turn, is 
associated with better managerial performance and allows banks to compete through lower 
loan rates. Greater cost efficiency of banks also enhances financial stability (Berger and 
DeYoung, 1997; Podpiera and Weill, 2008) and promotes economic growth (Lucchetti, Papi 
and Zazzaro, 2001; Hasan, Koetter and Wedow, 2009). 
The consensus of the widely-studied topic of cost efficiency of Chinese banks is that the 
overall efficiency of the banking sector is still low compared to international standards (Allen 
et al., 2017) and especially the five largest state-owned banks (the Big Five1) suffer from low 
efficiency (Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2009: Fungáčová, Pessarossi and Weill, 2013). Given 
that the Big Five account for about 40% of Chinese banking system assets, their low 
efficiency potentially threatens the country’s financial development and financial stability. 
Specific policy measures that might help raise efficiency include reducing the market share of 
the Big Five banks and making significant changes in governance practices. 
However, the literature falls short of identifying the factors that explain this low 
efficiency. This gap is essentially due to a methodological limitation. Former studies are only 
considering the overall efficiency of Chinese banks and do not decompose it into persistent 
and transient component (long-term and short-term inefficiency). This distinction seems to be 
instrumental for understanding the Chinese banking sector. Persistent inefficiency accounts 
for the presence of structural problems in the bank, which include poor organization, weak 
management or political incentives preventing cost minimization. Transient inefficiency is 
related to time-varying issues such as the adaptation to changes in the economic environment.  
This distinction does reflect a common hypothesis concerning the explanation of the low 
efficiency of China’s Big Five banks compared to other types of banks, such as foreign banks 
and joint-stock banks. Big Five banks would be structurally inefficient compared to other 
types of banks. Such an assumption entails critical policy measures, such as reducing state 
ownership, shrinking banks’ size, reorganizing their structure, and creating profit-oriented 
 
1 The Big Five banks are the following banks: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of 
China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank and Bank of Communications. Under the China Banking 





incentives for management. If low Big Five banks’ efficiency does not stem from structural 
reasons, different policy measures would be required to ensure that these banks are efficient in 
the short-run. Short-term adjustments such as changes in the inputs prices or temporary policy 
support would then be more adequate than structural transformations.  
Identifying the sources of Big Five banks’ inefficiency is vital for selecting the 
appropriate policy measures. Recent progress in efficiency methodology allows identifying 
the relative proportion of long-term and short-term inefficiency within the overall efficiency 
of banks. The objective of this study is to draw upon this novel technique to provide a new 
perspective on explaining the different level of efficiencies among Chinese banks. We test the 
hypothesis of different long-term and short-term efficiency of Chinese banks by providing a 
decomposition of their efficiency into its transient and persistent components. Making this 
distinction is instrumental for understanding the Chinese banking sector and designing 
appropriate policy measures. 
We measure the persistent inefficiency and transient inefficiency of Chinese banks by 
applying the model of Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker (2014) and thus contribute to the 
burgeoning literature accounting for this distinction. Their approach takes advantage of the 
nature of panel data to decompose overall efficiency into persistent and transient components. 
It relies on a three-step procedure that estimates a cost function with panel data and applies 
the stochastic frontier approach to isolate persistent and transient inefficiency components. 
The model provides a major improvement to traditional stochastic frontier models in the 
literature on bank efficiency. Former models based on the stochastic frontier approach view 
inefficiency either as time-invariant (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984; Berger, 1993), time-invariant 
mixed with firm variables (Battese and Coelli, 1992, 1995) or transient only (Greene, 2005). 
The model of Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker (2014) allows us to estimate and disentangle 
persistent efficiency and transient efficiency.2 
Filippini and Greene (2016) find that this approach provides new and more precise 
estimates. The persistent efficiency estimate provides a new measure of efficiency which is 
not related to the estimate provided by the approach of Battese and Coelli (1995). The 
estimate of the transient inefficiency, while more closely related to the one obtained using the 
approach of Greene (2005), provides useful additional information on short-term inefficiency. 
We consider a large and unique dataset of 166 banks for the period 2008–2015, 
including the Big Five banks, joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial banks, rural 
 
2 Two recent papers provide alternative ways to estimate the model. Tsionas and Kumbhakar (2014) use a 




banks and foreign banks. We hand-collect data from banks annual reports to extend the 
coverage of our dataset. We rely on the panel nature of our dataset to examine the roots of 
Chinese banks inefficiency and assess whether lower efficiency for the Big Five banks is 
observed for both persistent and transient components. 
Our paper contributes to the analysis of the efficiency of Chinese banks. Our results help 
better understand the gap in efficiency of the Big Five banks and demonstrate the application 
of the stochastic frontier model in separating persistent bank efficiency from transient bank 
efficiency. In terms of methodology, this paper also complements the recent work of 
Badunenko and Kumbakhar (2017) on disentangling persistent and transient efficiency in the 
Indian banking industry. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the overview of the 
Chinese banking sector and reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents the data and 
methodology. Section 4 displays the main estimations. Section 5 provides robustness checks 
and section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Related literature 
This section provides a description of the Chinese banking industry and reviews the 
main literature on the efficiency of Chinese banks. 
2.1 Chinese banking industry 
The Chinese government has gradually reformed the banking sector over recent decades, 
a transformation that reflects trends for the Chinese economy as a whole. Prior to the launch 
of reforms in 1978, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) was the sole bank in China performing 
both central bank and commercial bank functions. Major Chinese banks today are publicly 
listed and rank among the world’s largest banks. Banking sector assets more than tripled 
between 2008 and 2016. They account for over 310% of GDP,3 making the Chinese banking 
system one of the world’s largest (IMF, 2017). Bank loans still serve as the main source of 
external financing for Chinese firms. According to the World Bank data, domestic credit to 
private sector by banks represents 157% of Chinese GDP in 2016, compared with 97% in 
France, 77% in Germany and 53% in the United States. 
 




Several reforms profoundly reshaped the banking industry. The first reform of 
consequence was the creation of a two-tier banking system. The PBC retained its central bank 
functions and transferred its commercial operations to four specialized state-owned banks: 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Bank of China (BoC), the People’s Construction Bank 
of China (which changed its name in 1996 to China Construction Bank, or CCB), and the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). They were allowed to accept deposits and 
grant loans and started to function as financial intermediaries in the mid-1980s. Together with 
the Bank of Communications (BOCOM), these banks today constitute the Big Five. 
The second phase of reforms started in 1994. In response to the accelerating asset 
quality deterioration of large state-owned banks and separate policy lending from commercial 
lending, the government created three policy banks. In 1998, the first round of state-bank 
recapitalization was implemented to deal with non-performing loans. Transfer of non-
performing loans to asset management companies commenced within a year, and the 
government put in place reforms to stimulate competition among banks. This led to the 
creation of new bank formats such as national-level joint-stock commercial banks, city credit 
cooperatives and city cooperative banks. China acceded to the WTO in 2001, committing to 
opening its banking system to foreign banks over the next five years. 
The third stage of reform focused on developing governing structures and strengthening 
the balance sheets of the mammoth state-owned banks. Four largest banks were gradually 
transferred into joint-stock companies to prepare them for a series of initial public offerings. 
The first IPO took place in 2006, the fourth and final one (ABC) was completed in 2010. 
The revamping of the banking sector was accompanied by a gradual liberalization of the 
financial system. Interest rate deregulation began with liberalization of lending rates in 2013. 
China removed the interest rate ceiling on deposits of less than one year in October 2015. 
These changes seem to have improved credit pricing and increased the share of loans well 
above or below the benchmark rate (OECD, 2017).4 China also rolled out a deposit insurance 
scheme in May 2015. In a pull-back from the trend to market-based mechanisms, the PBC 
introduced selective liquidity support and reined in the scope of measures to liberalize the 
financial system (OECD, 2017). 
Despite general success at reforms and the entry of foreign investors, China’s banking 
sector remains largely in the hands of the state. The state authorities involved depend on the 
type of bank. The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) classifies banks into 
several groups based on ownership structure. The first group is the Big Five banks. These are 
 




the largest state-owned banks that have been transferred into joint-stock companies and 
publicly listed in the last decade. In addition to having the state as majority owner, they all 
have private and foreign minority owners. These banks provide nationwide wholesale and 
retail services and have a strong focus on funding state-owned enterprises. According to the 
CBRC, the big state-owned banks held 39 % of all commercial banking system assets in 2015. 
Despite the continuous growth in their assets, their share in the banking sector is gradually 
decreasing, spiking at 57% in 2004. The decrease is mainly due to other banks and non-bank 
institutions that have entered lending and credit market (Allen et al., 2018). 
The second group of banks consists of joint-stock commercial banks. These also operate 
nationwide, and are usually mid-sized banks with mixed ownership. The central government 
or a municipal government rarely act as direct owners of such banks. These are relatively new 
banks, with the first ones established in the early 2000s. Joint stock banks largely operate 
typical commercial banking business and target an SME customer base. These banks 
accounted for 19% of Chinese banking sector assets at the end of 2015, an increase of 7% 
from 2004. 
The third group, “small-size” banks operating regionally or locally, includes city 
commercial banks, rural commercial banks and small local banks (e.g. rural cooperative 
banks, rural credit cooperatives, and village and township banks). City commercial banks are 
a product of shareholding reform of former urban credit cooperatives. Before 2006, a city 
commercial bank could only operate in the city where it was headquartered. Originally 
created to carry out local government lending operations, some of these banks are still owned 
by local governments. These banks are instrumental in funding small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Their share in the banking sector has doubled within ten years, reaching 11 % at 
the end of 2015. Rural banks mainly target the rural population and usually operate within a 
small township or village. 
The fourth group, foreign banks, does not account for a significant part of the banking 
sector assets. Their share has not changed significantly during the last decade and it stood at 
about 1 % in 2015. 
2.2 Efficiency in Chinese banking 
Several studies investigate the efficiency of Chinese banks. Chen, Skully and Brown 
(2005) investigate the impact of the 1995 bank deregulation on the cost efficiency of Chinese 
banks. Estimating the cost efficiency of 43 Chinese banks over the period 1993–2000 with 




small joint-stock commercial banks are more efficient than medium-sized joint-stock 
commercial banks. The mean yearly cost efficiency scores for the whole sample range from 
42.6% to 58.2%. 
Fu and Heffernan (2007) estimate the cost efficiency of Chinese banks over the period 
1985–2002, employing the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). Their sample contains 14 banks 
(four state-owned banks and ten joint-stock commercial banks). They show that joint-stock 
commercial banks are more efficient than state-owned banks. The mean efficiency scores 
range between 40% and 52%, depending on the distributional assumptions. 
Ariff and Can (2008) extend the analysis of the efficiency of Chinese banks to profit 
efficiency. They measure cost efficiency and profit efficiency of 28 Chinese commercial 
banks over the period 19952004 with DEA. They estimate the mean cost efficiency of 
Chinese banks at 79.8%, significantly higher than mean profit efficiency which ranges 
between 43.9% and 50.5%, depending on the profit frontier specification. They also find a 
better cost and profit efficiency for joint-stock commercial banks than for state-owned banks. 
Berger, Hasan and Zhou (2009) study how ownership influences bank efficiency in 
China. Employing the stochastic frontier approach, they estimate cost and profit efficiency on 
a sample of 38 banks over the period 1994–2003. Their key conclusions are that the Big Four 
state-owned banks are the least efficient banks in China and foreign banks the most efficient. 
Their result stands for both cost efficiency and profit efficiency. The mean efficiency scores 
for the whole sample are 89.7% for cost efficiency and 47.6% for profit efficiency. 
Asmild and Matthews (2012) apply non-parametric multi-directional envelopment 
analysis to compare the efficiency of four state-owned banks and ten joint-stock banks over 
the period 1997-2008. Their methodology reveals “efficiency patterns” that suggest joint-
stock banks are more efficient than state-owned banks. The two types of banks do not appear 
to convergence over time. 
Fungáčová, Pessarossi and Weill (2013) investigate the relationship between bank 
competition and cost efficiency on a sample of 76 Chinese banks (including the Big Five 
banks, joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial banks, foreign banks and a few other 
banks) over the period 2002–2011. They utilize the stochastic frontier approach to measure 
cost efficiency scores. While observing an average efficiency score of 74.6% over the period 
for all Chinese banks, they find the Big Five banks to be the least efficient and foreign banks 
most efficient. In addition, they find no significant relation between bank competition and 




Dong et al. (2016) study cost and profit efficiency of Chinese banks between 2002 and 
2013. They use the stochastic frontier model of Battese and Coelli (1995) and gather a sample 
of 142 banks including the Big Five banks, joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial 
banks, and foreign banks. They extend the analysis of Berger, Hasan and Zhou (2009) to a 
greater sample and employ more recent data. They obtain mean efficiency scores of 69.7% for 
cost efficiency and 68.5% for profit efficiency. They also find that the Big Five banks are the 
least cost efficient banks and foreign banks most efficient. While the cost efficiency of the 
Big Five banks is significantly and persistently lower than the efficiency of all other groups, 
the highest profit efficiency is registered by the Big Five banks and joint-stock commercial 
banks. The authors point out an improvement in the profit and the cost efficiency for Chinese 
banks over the study period. 
To sum up, the literature on bank efficiency in China shows that ownership exerts an 
impact on bank efficiency, with a consensual view that the Big Five banks are less cost 
efficient than the other banks. We extend this literature by disentangling persistent efficiency 
and transient efficiency for our sample of Chinese banks, a sample larger than any dataset 
employed in earlier studies. 
 
3. Methodology and data 
This section lays out the methodology used to calculate the cost efficiency of banks and 
distinguish persistent inefficiency from transient inefficiency. A data description is included. 
3.1. Methodology 
The proposed methodology seeks to determine efficiency scores of Chinese banks with a 
view to disentangling persistent inefficiency from transient inefficiency. While persistent 
inefficiency is stable over time, transient inefficiency varies over time. Distinguishing 
persistent from transient inefficiency, sometimes referred to as the Greene problem, was long 
considered out of reach (Greene, 1980). Recent methodological innovations by Kumbhakar, 
Lien and Hardaker (2014), however, provide a solution. 
Taking advantage of the nature of panel data, they first construct a mechanism to 
separate persistent and transient inefficiency, starting with a standard cost function for panel 
data: 
 





where 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 denotes the 𝑖𝑡ℎ bank and 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇𝑖 denotes the time period in which bank 
𝑖 is observed, 𝑐𝑖𝑡 measures the total cost of the bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝒚𝑖𝑡 denotes the vector of 
outputs, 𝒘𝑖𝑡 the vector of input prices and ℎ(. ) is the cost function. 𝑎𝑖 is the error-term for the 
bank 𝑖 over all time periods and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the error term for bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡. 
Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker (2014) employ the two error terms of the panel data to 
distinguish between persistent and transient inefficiency. Using the SFA approach, they divide 
the time-invariant error-term 𝑎𝑖 into two parts: a random part that accounts for exogenous 
events affecting bank’s costs (𝑣0𝑖) and an inefficient part that reflects the bank’s cost 
inefficiencies (𝑢0𝑖): 
 
   𝑎𝑖 =  𝑣0𝑖 + 𝑢0𝑖  (2) 
 
By definition, 𝑢0𝑖 is fixed over time and represents the persistent inefficiency of bank i. 
They reproduce this approach and divide the variable error-term 𝜖𝑖𝑡 into a random part, which 
accounts for exogenous events affecting bank’s costs (𝑣𝑖𝑡), and an inefficient part (𝑢𝑖𝑡): 
 
   𝜖𝑖𝑡 =  𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (3) 
 
As 𝑢𝑖𝑡 changes over time, it represents the transient inefficiency, of bank i. Overall, the 
cost function becomes: 
 
   log 𝑐𝑖𝑡 = ℎ(𝒚𝑖𝑡 , 𝒘𝑖𝑡;  𝜽) + 𝑣0𝑖 + 𝑢0𝑖 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (4) 
 
The error term now has four components. The first component 𝑣0𝑖 captures the latent 
heterogeneity across banks. The second component, 𝑢0𝑖, captures the persistent inefficiency 
of the bank 𝑖. The third component 𝑣𝑖𝑡 captures the random shocks affecting the bank 𝑖 at 
each period 𝑡. The fourth component 𝑢𝑖𝑡 captures the transient inefficiency. 
To estimate the cost function (4), we employ the methodological approach developed by 
Kumbhakar, Wang and Horncastle (2015, p.275-276). 
In this three-step approach, a standard cost function for the panel data is first estimated 
as in (1). It has a fixed error-term 𝑎𝑖 and a variable error-term 𝜖𝑖𝑡. We employ a translog cost 
frontier with fixed-effects at the bank level. In line with Fungáčová, Pessarossi and Weill 




This approach assumes that banks collect deposits and transform them into loans using labor 
and capital. We consider two outputs, loans (y1) and other earning assets (y2). We incorporate 
three input prices. The first input price is the price of labor (w1), which is the ratio of 
personnel expenses to total assets (w1). The second input price is the price of physical capital 
(w2), computed as the ratio of other non-interest expenses to fixed assets. The last input price 
is the price of borrowed funds (w3), defined as the ratio of interest paid to total funding. 
Homogeneity conditions are achieved by scaling the price of labor and the price of physical 
capital by the price of borrowed funds. The explained variable is Total Cost (TC), which is the 
sum of personnel expenses, other non-interest expenses, and interest paid. We include dummy 
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where 𝑚 = 1, 2 and 𝑗 = 1, 2 denote the outputs and 𝑛 = 1, 2, 3 and 𝑘 = 1, 2, 3 denote the 
inputs prices. In this specification, 𝑎𝑖 captures the bank’s fixed effect and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the classical 
random noise. This first step gives the predicted value of 𝑎𝑖 and 𝜖𝑖𝑡, respectively 𝛼𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
The second step uses the predicted value 𝜀𝑖𝑡 obtained in (5) to estimate the time-varying 
inefficiency 𝑢𝑖𝑡. We assume that 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is a random noise i.i.d with a distribution 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) and 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 follows a distribution 𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2). We estimate 𝑢𝑖𝑡 in (3) with a standard stochastic-frontier 
technique. We obtain a prediction of the bank’s time-varying inefficiency ?̂?𝑖𝑡 using the 
Jondrow et al. (1982) procedure. Transient cost efficiency (TCE) is calculated as in Battese 
and Coelli (1988): 𝑇𝐶𝐸 =  exp ( ?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝜀𝑖𝑡). 
In the third step, we retrieve the bank’s persistent inefficiency. We split the bank’s 
fixed-effect 𝛼𝑖 predicted in (5) into two components: the bank’s latent heterogeneity 𝑣0𝑖 and 
the bank’s persistent inefficiency 𝑢0𝑖. Again, we assume that 𝑣0𝑖 is a random noise i.i.d. 
following a 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣0
2 ) distribution and that 𝑢0𝑖 follows a 𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢0
2 ) distribution. We estimate 
𝑢0𝑖 in (2) using a standard stochastic-frontier technique. We obtain a prediction of the bank’s 
persistent inefficiency ?̂?0𝑖 using the Jondrow et al. (1982) procedure. Persistent cost 
efficiency (PCE) is calculated as in Battese and Coelli (1988), 𝑃𝐶𝐸 =  exp (?̂?0𝑖). 
Finally, the overall cost efficiency (OCE) is obtained as the product of the persistent and 




We further refine this approach by parametrizing the variance of the inefficiency terms, 
in steps 2 and 3. We parametrize the variance of the transient and persistent efficiency using 
dummy variables for each bank type, employing Big Five as the benchmark group. We also 
employ a set of variables that is likely to affect banks’ efficiency in China: Equity Ratio, 
defined as the ratio of equity to assets; RRR, defined as the reserve requirement ratio, set by 
the PBC; Listed, which is a dummy variable taking one if the bank is listed; and HK Listed, 
which takes the value of one if the bank is listed in Hong-Kong and zero otherwise.  
 
3.2. Data 
Our analysis employs a unique dataset containing a total of 974 observations of 166 
banks, covering the period 2008-2015. We use hand-collected data from the annual reports of 
the relevant bank websites to supplement yearly bank-level financial statement data of 
Chinese banks from BankScope database. Our sample encompasses the majority of the 
Chinese banking sector’s assets. We omit earlier time periods as data are only available for a 
limited number of banks. To put our dataset into perspective; Berger, Hasan and Zhou (2009) 
use a 38-bank sample in their efficiency analysis, and Dong et al. (2016) a 142-bank sample 
in their investigation of cost and profit efficiency. 
The banks in our sample are divided into five categories based on ownership structure: 
the Big Five banks, joint-stock commercial banks (JSCB), city commercial banks (CCB), 
rural commercial banks (RCB) and foreign banks. This division follows the CBRC 
classifications. The descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the analysis are 
provided in Tables 1 and 2. 
We observe that the price of physical capital is much higher for foreign banks than for 
the other banks. This can be explained by the fact that the foreign banks have a small market 
share all around the country and their customers are mainly foreign companies. As such they 
do not have a large network of branches and therefore have lower fixed assets on average than 
the other banks. In addition they are mainly located in very large cities associated with higher 
operating costs for the offices. Our finding of higher price of physical capital accords with 
Dong et al. (2016) who report the mean price of physical capital for big banks, medium banks, 
and small banks, the latter category combining foreign banks and city commercial banks, and 







This section presents our results. We start with our main estimation of the cost function and 
present the transient and persistent efficiency across for different types of banks over time. 
We then move to the marginal effects analysis of the parametrized cost function.  
4.1. Main results 
This section presents our main results. Table 3 provides the estimated coefficients for the cost 
frontier. We display the mean efficiency scores per year and per type of banks in Table 4. We 
report overall, transient and persistent efficiency scores. 
Regarding the efficiency of the full sample, the average overall efficiency score is 
86.49%. This score is higher than what has been found in most of the previous studies. 
Fungáčová, Pessarossi and Weill (2013) obtain an average score of 74.6% and Dong et al. 
(2016) find an average score of 69.7%. Notably, it is lower than the mean efficiency score of 
89.7% reported by Berger, Hasan and Zhou (2009). 
Delving into the different components of the overall efficiency, we observe that the 
transient efficiency and the persistent efficiency reach very similar levels, with means over 
the period of 92.98% and 93.01%, respectively. The overall conclusion for Chinese banks 
must be that on average they suffer as much from persistent inefficiency as from transient 
inefficiency. 
Third, the evolution of transient efficiency over time does not show high volatility. 
Yearly mean scores for transient efficiency range between 92.82% and 93.09%. In addition, 
there is no clear trend for transient efficiency since there is no gradual rise or fall over the 
period. The same holds true when looking at the persistent efficiency of all banks, for which 
changes only stem from changes in the sample of banks. As a result, the overall efficiency of 
Chinese banks turns out to be quite stable over the period. 
Table 4 also reports the efficiency of banks depending on ownership type. We can draw 
several conclusions on the efficiency of the Big Five banks. The Big Five banks have lower 
overall efficiency than most other types of banks. While the Big Five banks have an average 
overall efficiency of 86.14%, average overall efficiency is 86.21% for the rural commercial 
banks, 86.79% for the joint-stock commercial banks and 88.17% for foreign banks. 
We calculate the differences in the overall efficiency scores between the Big Five banks 
and the other types of banks and test their significance in Table 5. Figure 1 draws the mean 




the Big Five banks in comparison with that for joint-stock commercial banks and foreign 
banks. Only city commercial banks, with an average overall efficiency of 85.81%, are less 
efficient than the Big Five banks (although the difference is not statistically significant). We 
also test to see if the efficiency of the joint-stock commercial banks differs from the other 
domestic banks (the Big Five banks, CCB and RCB). Joint-stock commercial banks exhibit a 
higher efficiency than the other domestic banks. This may suggest that direct state ownership 
in China in these other banks might hamper bank efficiency. 
The comparison of the overall efficiency across the different types of banks confirms the 
general conclusion that the Big Five banks exhibit a lower cost efficiency than other types of 
banks. In line with the previous studies of Berger, Hasan and Zhou (2009), Fungáčová, 
Pessarossi and Weill (2013) and Dong et al. (2016), we find that the Big Five banks are less 
efficient than the joint-stock commercial banks and the foreign banks.5 Our results differ 
slightly from the previous literature when comparing the efficiency of the Big Five banks and 
city commercial banks; we conclude higher efficiency for the Big Five banks, while 
Fungáčová, Pessarossi and Weill (2013) and Dong et al. (2016) find the opposite. However, 
time periods and bank samples of these studies differ from the present study. They use a lower 
number of observations for city commercial banks, which may explain differences in 
conclusions. Overall, since we use more recent and comprehensive data than the former 
studies, our findings tend to confirm the persistence of low efficiency for the Big Five banks. 
We now turn to our key question: Does the low efficiency of the Big Five banks mainly 
stem from persistent inefficiency or from transient inefficiency? We find that persistent 
inefficiency slightly dominates transient inefficiency for the Big Five banks. Mean persistent 
efficiency is 92.36% and mean transient efficiency 93.26%. The low overall efficiency of the 
Big Five banks results more from persistent than from transient inefficiency. 
This result is supported by the analysis of the differences in transient efficiency and in 
persistent efficiency between the Big Five banks and the other types of banks. We report the 
differences in transient and persistent inefficiency and test their significance in Tables 6 and 
7, respectively. Figures 2 and 3 draw the mean transient and persistent efficiency respectively, 
per group and over years. Over the period, the Big Five banks do not have significantly lower 
transient efficiency than any other type of banks. However, they have significantly lower 
persistent efficiency than the joint-stock commercial banks and the foreign banks. Hence, the 
weak performance of the Big Five banks in cost efficiency relative to the other types of banks 
comes from a lower persistent efficiency. Low persistent efficiency indicates the presence of 
 




structural problems in these banks. Our results support the view that major changes should be 
implemented to enhance the efficiency of the large state-owned banks. On the opposite, the 
Big Five banks are as efficient as the other banks in term of transient efficiency. This 
indicates that they are able to efficiently adjust their costs to the market conditions. Hence, 
our results support the need of structural reforms of the Big Five banks but do not highlight 
the need for specific short-term reforms.  
The analysis of the yearly transient efficiency scores uncovers that the time series of the 
transient efficiency is particularly volatile for the Big Five banks. The mean transient 
efficiency score evolves between 91.05% and 94.47%. It is much more volatile than for the 
other types of banks.6 This volatility of short-term inefficiency also results in more volatile 
overall efficiency. This result suggests that the Big Five banks are particularly reactive to 
short-term events related to e.g. window guidance. 
The only group of banks with higher persistent than transient efficiency are the foreign 
banks. All other bank types are more hampered by persistent inefficiency than by transient 
inefficiency, following the same pattern as the Big Five banks. In line with the results for the 
overall efficiency, the persistent efficiency of the joint-stock commercial banks is 
significantly higher than that of the other domestic banks. This supports the view that the 
influence of the state on the other domestic banks may exert a negative impact on the 
persistent efficiency. 
In a nutshell, we find that the Big Five banks are less efficient than joint-stock 
commercial banks and foreign banks. This lower efficiency mainly stems from low persistent 
efficiency, suggesting that structural changes have to be implemented to improve the 
efficiency of the Big Five banks. In addition, transient efficiency is particularly volatile for 
the Big Five banks, which tend to react more to short-term shocks. 
 
4.2. Marginal Effects 
We now turn to the parametrization of the cost function and the associated marginal 
effects on banks’ efficiency. Table 8 presents the estimations of the parametrized error terms, 
with Big Five as the omitted group. As these estimates are not readily interpretable, we 
compute the marginal effects of each variable on the unconditional transient and persistent 
efficiency, following the approach laid out in Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker (2014). Table 9 
 
6 The time-series standard deviation of the transient mean efficiency of the Big Five banks is 1.13%, while it is 




presents the results. We report the marginal effect of parameters on both the mean and the 
variance of the inefficiency components. A negative sign of the margin indicates a reduction 
in cost inefficiency. We obtain estimates of the standard errors using a bootstrapping 
approach: we calculate 1,000 iterations of the parametrized cost function and derive the 
corresponding distribution of the marginal effect.  
We first turn to the marginal effect of the parameters concerning the transient 
inefficiency. Following our main results, we do not observe any difference in the effect of the 
different bank types on transient efficiency, compared with Big Five banks. This is the case 
for both the mean and the variance of the transient inefficiency term. This confirms the view 
that Big Five banks do not suffer from a higher transient inefficiency. We also do not observe 
any significant effect of the equity ratio, the reserve requirement ratio, listing in general, or 
listing in Hong-Kong. This supports the view that short-term inefficiency essentially stems 
from the ability of banks to adapt to their environment in the short-term. Regulatory 
requirements as well as structural changes that can originate from the listing of the company 
in the domestic or foreign markets do not seem to exert any significant impact.   
We now consider the marginal effects of the parameters on the persistent inefficiency of 
Chinese banks. Confirming our main results, we observe that there is a negative marginal 
impact on persistent inefficiency for foreign and joint-stock banks.  Compared with Big Five 
banks, being a foreign bank marginally reduces the persistent inefficiency by 2.98%. The 
effect is also negative for joint-stock commercial banks (-0.058%). We further observe a 
negative marginal effect on the variance of the persistent inefficiency. On the contrary, we do 
not observe any significant effect concerning RCB or CCB for neither the mean nor the 
variance of the persistent inefficiency. Hence, the parametrization of the inefficiency terms of 
the cost function supports our main findings.  
Regarding the effect of the other parameters on the persistent inefficiency, we document 
three findings. First, increasing the equity ratio of banks exerts a positive marginal impact on 
persistent inefficiency. A one-point increase of the equity ratio is associated with a reduction 
of 0.644% of the persistent inefficiency, as well as a reduction of 0.114% of its variance. This 
finding indicates that by increasing the equity requirements the authorities could contribute to 
reduction of banks’ persistent inefficiency. This means that higher capital ratio is associated 
with a better cost efficiency. Banks with stronger financial positions have to pay a financing 
premium, reducing their costs. This is in line with the findings confirming the positive impact 





Second, we document a negative marginal effect of an increase in the reserve 
requirement ratio on persistent inefficiency. Increasing this rate by one-point reduces Chinese 
banks’ efficiency by 0.003%. Increasing the mandatory reserves at the PBC turns out to be 
costly for banks in that it also contributes to the reduction of their efficiency in the long-run. 
This result entails important consequences for the central bank, as a tightening of the 
monetary policy also produces a negative impact on the cost efficiency. It complements the 
findings of Fungáčová et al. (2016), who show that while the use of reserve requirements is an 
effective monetary policy tool, it does not foster bank lending. A decrease in banks’ cost 
efficiency can explain this finding.  
Last, while listing in general does not significantly impact banks’ persistent efficiency, 
being listed in Hong-Kong contributes to a marginal reduction in banks’ persistent 
inefficiency. This is the case for both the mean and the variance of persistent inefficiency. 
This result shows the crucial role of international listing in fostering efficiency in the long-
run. It also emphasizes the role of foreign ownership in providing the appropriate incentives 
for Chinese banks to curb their cost inefficiencies. Our results are thus in line with the 
literature that finds the positive effect of Hong-Kong listing on tampering management’s 
misconduct (e.g. Peng et al., 2011).   
Overall, both our main results and our marginal effects’ analyses support the view that 
Big Five banks’ inefficiency stems from long-term inefficiency. We document the role of 
equity ratio and foreign listing in improving persistent efficiency, while increasing reserve 
requirements are associated with a decline in persistent efficiency.  
 
 
5. Robustness checks 
We provide three robustness tests to confirm the validity of our results. First, we 
estimate the cost function using average market input prices. Second, we compute efficiency 
scores based on Battese and Coelli’s (1995) approach and compare them with our results. 
Third, we perform estimations by subperiods. 
5.1. Average market input prices 
The use of a cost function makes the underlying assumption that markets are 
competitive. The large (even if decreasing) share of Big Five banks in the Chinese banking 




be able to set the price of their inputs, distorting the competition in the banking industry to 
their advantage. This could affect our results by overestimating the efficiency of the Big Five.  
To consider this possibility, we follow the approach of Jiang et al. (2013) and use 
market average input prices for each year in the estimation of the cost function. Market 
average prices are likely to be more exogenous to Big Five banks, better reflecting their 
ability to minimize their cost without taking advantage of the leading position in the banking 
sector. We then recalculate the cost frontier and the efficiency estimates. Table 10 reports the 
overall, transient, and persistent efficiency scores, using market average input prices. 
Considering the competition in the input side of the market strongly reduces the overall 
efficiency of the Chinese banking sector. The overall efficiency drops to 61.95%. This is 
largely due to a drop in persistent efficiency that falls to 63.69%. Transient efficiency is closer 
to our main estimates, at 89.29%. Most of the decline is due to a collapse of Big Five’s 
persistent efficiency. It reaches 23.52% over the period, compared to 92.36% in our main 
specification of the cost function. Their overall efficiency reaches 21.09%, which is 
substantially lower than our main estimates. While the other banks also experience a decline 
in their efficiency scores when using the average market  input prices, this reduction is much 
less substantial than for Big Five. Overall, taking into account the ability of Big Five banks to 
distort input prices in the banking sector confirm our results. Big Five are substantially less 
efficient than the other types of banks, primarily because of their very poor long-run 
efficiency.  
 
5.2. Alternative efficiency estimation 
While the approach of Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker (2014) has now been largely 
implemented in the efficiency literature, it remains relatively new in the banking literature. To 
put our results in perspective with previous studies and ensure that they do not stem from an 
extended sample, we calculate Battese and Coelli’s (1995) measure of cost efficiency, 
commonly used in the banking literature. Table 11 reports the efficiency scores.  
Overall, we obtain similar estimates of efficiency as in our main estimations. Using 
Battese and Coelli’s (1995) approach, the overall efficiency reaches 88.62% for the whole 
sample, compared with 86.49% using  Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker’s (2014) methodology. 
The estimates for the different groups of banks are also in line with our main results in that 
Big Five banks are less efficient than joint-stock commercial banks and foreign banks. Our 




banks, a result that cannot be derived using the previous methodology, while being essential 
to capture the characteristics of the Chinese banking sector.  
 
5.3. Estimations by subperiods 
We check whether our results stand unchanged when we divide the full sample into 
subsamples. The period of study has been characterized by several reforms which were 
gradually implemented over time. We therefore divide the full sample into two subperiods of 
equal size: 2008-2011, 2012-2015. We redo the estimations separately for each subperiod. 
The estimations are reported in Table 12.  
We need to point out that with estimations on short periods, we obtain very similar 
levels of persistent efficiency for all types of banks. This is the consequence of the 
implemented methodology: we use a fixed effects model on a very short period over a large 
number of banks and a stochastic frontier model on the residuals. By construction, this 
provides us with estimations which are very similar across banks. Therefore the estimations 
by subperiods are more interesting for the comparison of transient efficiency across banks. 
We observe that transient efficiency has decreased between the first and the second 
subperiod. While mean transient efficiency scores are between 95.58% and 95.82% for 2008-
2011, they range from 94.18% to 94.26%. Thus the analysis by subperiods indicates an 
improvement in transient efficiency which was not observed with estimations over the whole 
period as in that case we found transient efficiency quite stable over time. Since persistent 
efficiency is very stable over time with this methodology on short periods, the overall 
efficiency has improved between two subperiods.We still find that there are differences in 
efficiency for different types of banks. The overall efficiency and the transient efficiency are 
lower for the Big Five banks in comparison with joint-stock commercial banks and foreign 
banks. 
6. Conclusion 
This analysis of Chinese bank efficiency builds on a common claim in the literature that 
China’s Big Five banks suffer from low cost efficiency. Given that these banks control a large 
market share of the Chinese banking industry, weak cost efficiency could put drag on the 
Chinese economy by slowing economic growth or destabilizing the financial system. 
Decomposition of the overall inefficiency of Chinese banks into persistent inefficiency 




the Big Five banks comes mainly from structural problems or short-term adaptations to 
economic conditions. 
Our first observation is that transient and persistent efficiency are roughly of the same 
order of magnitude for all Chinese banks, i.e. overall efficiency is equally decomposed 
between both components. Second, the Big Five banks have on average lower overall 
efficiency than other Chinese banks. This weakness of the Big Five banks stems from their 
lower persistent efficiency. Indeed, the Big Five banks have greater transient efficiency than 
persistent efficiency, and their persistent efficiency is lower than for the other types of banks. 
No difference among types of banks is observed for transient efficiency. Third, the Big Five’s 
transient efficiency is more volatile than for the other banks, suggesting the Big Five banks 
are more sensitive to short-term events. Finally, we document a positive marginal effect of the 
capital ratio and Hong-Kong listing on persistent efficiency, and a negative effect of an 
increase in reserve requirements. This result indicates how the regulator might be able to 
contribute to the lowering of Chinese banks’ persistent inefficiency.  
Our main conclusion is that the much-discussed efficiency problem of the Big Five 
banks in China may be largely attributed to persistent inefficiency; the short-term inefficiency 
of the Big Five banks is no different from the other types of banks. As higher volatility of the 
Big Five transient inefficiency could also blur interpretations of overall efficiency score, the 
clarity provided here by differentiating two inefficiency components is welcome. Low 
persistent efficiency of the Big Five banks supports the view that China needs to move ahead 
with major structural reforms of the banking industry. Such reforms will likely include further 
privatization, and higher capital ratio requirements, in order to obtain changes in the 
governance structures and reductions in state support. Future research could include 
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This table provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in the frontier estimation. Total Costs 




  All Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Total Costs (tc) 974  17,920     2,309     59,481     4     476,525    
Gross Loans (y1) 974  389,076     41,082     1,349,610     98     11,900,000    
Other Earning Assets (y2) 974  329,216     41,060     1,041,124     163     8,638,760    
Personal Expenses/Assets (w1) 974  0.0060     0.0055     0.0027     0.0004     0.0271    
Operating Expenses/Assets (w2) 974  1.7158     0.7653     2.7836     0.0007     24.8596    








Descriptive statistics by bank type 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics of the variables depending on the bank type. Total Costs (tc) 
is the sum of personal expenses, interest expenses and other expenses. All variables are in CNY 
millions. 
 
 N Mean Median 
The Big Five Banks    
No. of banks 5   
Total Costs (tc) 40  270,608     255,797    
Gross Loans (y1) 40  6,138,315     6,035,720    
Other Earning Assets (y2) 40  4,743,255     5,051,629    
Personnel Expenses/Assets (w1) 40  0.0053     0.0054    
Operating Expenses/Assets (w2) 40  0.4750     0.4435    
Interests/Total Funding (w3) 40  0.0130     0.0134    
    
Joint-Stock Commercial Banks    
No. of banks 12   
Total Costs (tc) 92  43,420     36,807    
Gross Loans (y1) 92  918,876     784,837    
Other Earning Assets (y2) 92  839,852     631,380    
Personnel Expenses/Assets (w1) 92  0.0049     0.0049    
Operating Expenses/Assets (w2) 92  0.9502     0.8469    
Interests/Total Funding (w3) 92  0.0136     0.0129    
    
City Commercial Banks    
No. of banks 83   
Total Costs (tc)  502     3,480     2,114    
Gross Loans (y1)  502     65,194     35,992    
Other Earning Assets (y2)  502     75,668     40,473    
Personnel Expenses/Assets (w1)  502     0.0052     0.0050    
Operating Expenses/Assets (w2)  502     0.9196     0.6224    
Interests/Total Funding (w3)  502     0.0134     0.0130    
    
Rural Commercial Banks    
No. of banks 26   
Total Costs (tc) 123  4,409     2,486    
Gross Loans (y1) 123  82,166     55,781    
Other Earning Assets (y2) 123  79,825     39,267    
Personnel Expenses/Assets (w1) 123  0.0061     0.0059    
Operating Expenses/Assets (w2) 123  0.7199     0.5068    
Interests/Total Funding (w3) 123  0.0145     0.0140    
    
Foreign Banks    
No. of banks 40   
Total Costs (tc)  217     1,594     882    
Gross Loans (y1)  217     27,913     13,526    
Other Earning Assets (y2)  217     26,986     13,445    
Personnel Expenses/Assets (w1)  217     0.0083     0.0073    
Operating Expenses/Assets (w2)  217     4.6753     3.4375    









Panel translog cost frontier with fixed-effects at the bank-level. Definition of the variables is provided 
in the methodological section. We follow the approach of Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker (2014) and 
divide the efficiency into persistent and transient parts. Time dummy variables are included but not 
reported. *, ** and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
  log(tc/w3) 
log(y1) 0.554*** 
  (3.63) 
log(y1)² 0.189*** 
  (11.08) 
log(y2) 0.316*** 
  (3.47) 
log(y2)² 0.154*** 
  (9.35) 
log(y1) × log(y2) -0.167*** 
  (-9.97) 
log(w1/w3) 0.306 
  (1.41) 
0.5 × log(w1/w3)² 0.246*** 
  (8.98) 
log(w2/w3) -0.026 
  (-0.22) 
0.5 × log(w2/w3)² 0.022** 
  (2.59) 
0.5 × log(w1/w3) × log(w2/w3) -0.002 
  (-0.04) 
log(y1) × log(w1/w3)  0.046*** 
  (2.66) 
log(y1) × log(w2/w3)  -0.016 
  (-0.89) 
log(y2) × log(w1/w3)  -0.026 
  (-1.60) 
log(y2) × log(w2/w3)  0.021* 
  (1.72) 
Constant 2.328** 
  (2.57) 
Transient Error component   
usigmas   
Constant -4.723*** 
  (-22.34) 
Persistent Error Component   
usigmas   
Constant -4.755*** 
  (-6.31) 
N 974 
No. of groups 166 
F 439.39*** 
R² Within 0.95 








This table provides the efficiency scores of the banks over the years and depending on the bank 
type. We follow Kumbhakar, Lien, and Hardaker (2014) and divide efficiency into persistent and 
transient parts. 
 
Years   All   Big 5 
    Overall Transient Persistent   Overall Transient Persistent 
2008   86.44% 92.82% 93.13%   84.09% 91.05% 92.36% 
2009   86.66% 93.08% 93.09%   85.87% 92.97% 92.36% 
2010   86.61% 93.09% 93.04%   86.94% 94.13% 92.36% 
2011   86.58% 93.08% 93.02%   84.95% 91.97% 92.36% 
2012   86.36% 92.88% 92.94%   86.50% 93.66% 92.36% 
2013   86.32% 92.85% 92.94%   87.25% 94.47% 92.36% 
2014   86.53% 93.06% 92.99%   86.89% 94.08% 92.36% 
2015   86.49% 93.00% 93.01%   86.60% 93.76% 92.36% 
Total   86.49% 92.98% 93.01%   86.14% 93.26% 92.36% 
                  
    Joint-Stock   Foreign 
    Overall Transient Persistent   Overall Transient Persistent 
2008   87.00% 93.45% 93.11%   88.20% 92.96% 94.87% 
2009   87.42% 93.89% 93.11%   88.83% 93.47% 95.03% 
2010   87.69% 94.18% 93.11%   88.06% 92.87% 94.81% 
2011   87.11% 93.70% 92.97%   87.84% 92.75% 94.71% 
2012   86.48% 93.02% 92.97%   87.94% 92.83% 94.72% 
2013   86.94% 93.52% 92.96%   87.69% 92.53% 94.78% 
2014   86.23% 92.75% 92.97%   88.07% 92.87% 94.83% 
2015   85.60% 92.08% 92.97%   88.89% 93.70% 94.87% 
Total   86.79% 93.30% 93.02%   88.17% 92.99% 94.82% 
                  
    CCB   RCB 
    Overall Transient Persistent   Overall Transient Persistent 
2008   86.12% 93.15% 92.47%   84.33% 90.48% 93.20% 
2009   86.01% 93.02% 92.45%   85.19% 91.42% 93.17% 
2010   85.73% 92.85% 92.33%   86.77% 93.21% 93.09% 
2011   85.87% 93.10% 92.24%   87.28% 93.71% 93.14% 
2012   85.87% 93.10% 92.22%   85.13% 91.86% 92.44% 
2013   85.61% 92.74% 92.30%   86.26% 92.93% 92.71% 
2014   85.85% 92.97% 92.34%   86.74% 93.54% 92.76% 
2015   85.53% 92.64% 92.33%   86.64% 93.46% 92.74% 






Differences in overall efficiency 
 
This table provides the difference in the overall efficiency scores of the Big 5 banks over the 
years. Student’s test is used to determine significance. *, **, and *** denote significant difference 











Big5 - All 
JSCB - (Big5, CCB and 
RCB) 
2008 -0.0291*** -0.0203 -0.0024 -0.0411** -0.0247 0.0126 
  (-5.51) (-1.24) (-0.15) (-2.48) (-1.55) (1.17) 
2009 -0.0155** -0.0014 0.0068 -0.0296** -0.0083 0.0151* 
  (-2.82) (-0.12) (0.54) (-2.37) (-0.67) (1.99) 
2010 -0.0076 0.0121 0.0016 -0.0112 0.0034 0.0172** 
  (-1.35) (1.14) (0.14) (-0.76) (0.29) (2.4) 
2011 -0.0216* -0.0092 -0.0233* -0.0289** -0.017 0.011 
  (-1.98) (-0.71) (-2.11) (-2.79) (-1.48) (1.38) 
2012 0.0002 0.0063 0.0137 -0.0144 0.0015 0.0072 
  (0.03) (0.36) (0.32) (-1.24) (0.07) (0.47) 
2013 0.0032 0.0165 0.0099 -0.0044 0.0097 0.011 
  (0.46) (0.95) (0.35) (-0.25) (0.51) (0.83) 
2014 0.0066 0.0105 0.0016 -0.0118 0.0037 0.0013 
  (0.68) (0.94) (0.16) (-0.96) (0.32) (0.18) 
2015 0.01 0.0108 -0.0004 -0.0229** 0.0012 -0.0025 
  (1.24) (0.96) (-0.04) (-2.24) (0.1) (-0.35) 
Total -0.0065** 0.0033 -0.0007 -0.0203*** -0.0037 0.0089** 






Differences in transient efficiency 
 
This table provides the difference in the transient efficiency scores of the Big 5 banks over the 
years. Student’s test is used to determine significance. *, ** and *** denote significant difference 













JSCB - (Big5, CCB and 
RCB) 
2008 -0.024*** -0.021 0.0057 -0.0191 -0.0186 0.0079 
  (-3.46) (-1.22) (0.34) (-1.2) (-1.17) (0.69) 
2009 -0.0091* -0.0005 0.0155 -0.005 -0.0011 0.0104 
  (-1.9) (-0.05) (1.34) (-0.42) (-0.11) (1.54) 
2010 -0.0005 0.0128 0.0092 0.0126 0.0109 0.0119* 
  (-0.16) (1.43) (0.97) (0.88) (1.09) (2) 
2011 -0.0173* -0.0113 -0.0174 -0.0078 -0.0116 0.0058 
  (-1.83) (-1) (-1.64) (-0.73) (-1.18) (0.86) 
2012 0.0064* 0.0055 0.0179 0.0082 0.0081 0.0014 
  (2.14) (0.34) (0.48) (0.74) (0.44) (0.1) 
2013 0.0095** 0.0174 0.0154 0.0194 0.0168 0.0065 
  (3.11) (1.1) (0.77) (1.02) (1.03) (0.59) 
2014 0.0133* 0.0112 0.0055 0.0121 0.0106 -0.004 
  (1.83) (1.24) (0.6) (0.98) (1.1) (-0.68) 
2015 0.0168** 0.0113 0.0031 0.0006 0.008 -0.0081 
  (2.21) (1.04) (0.38) (0.06) (0.79) (-1.22) 
Total -0.0004 0.0033 0.0043 0.0027 0.0029 0.0037 







Differences in persistent efficiency 
 
 
This table provides the evolving differences in the persistent efficiency scores of the Big 5 banks 
over the years. Student’s test is used to determine significance. *, ** and *** denote significant 











Big5 - All 
JSCB – (Big5, CCB and 
RCB) 
2008 -0.0075 -0.0011 -0.0084* -0.0251*** -0.0081 0.0056 
  (-1.44) (-0.14) (-1.85) (-6.69) (-1.07) (1.16) 
2009 -0.0075 -0.0009 -0.0081 -0.0267*** -0.0077 0.0059 
  (-1.44) (-0.13) (-1.73) (-6.54) (-1.01) (1.26) 
2010 -0.0075 0.0003 -0.0073 -0.0245*** -0.0071 0.0067 
  (-1.44) (0.04) (-1.45) (-5.6) (-0.95) (1.45) 
2011 -0.0061 0.0012 -0.0078 -0.0235*** -0.0068 0.0059 
  (-1.11) (0.15) (-1.59) (-5.1) (-0.84) (1.18) 
2012 -0.0061 0.0014 -0.0008 -0.0236*** -0.006 0.0069 
  (-1.11) (0.17) (-0.05) (-5.07) (-0.65) (1.14) 
2013 -0.006 0.0006 -0.0035 -0.0242*** -0.0061 0.0056 
  (-1.04) (0.08) (-0.28) (-5.22) (-0.68) (0.95) 
2014 -0.0061 0.0002 -0.004 -0.0247*** -0.0065 0.0053 
  (-1.11) (0.02) (-0.33) (-6.18) (-0.74) (0.94) 
2015 -0.0061 0.0003 -0.0038 -0.0251*** -0.0067 0.0054 
  (-1.11) (0.04) (-0.31) (-6.44) (-0.77) (0.97) 
Total -0.0066*** 0.0003 -0.0046 -0.0246*** -0.0068** 0.0059*** 






Parametrization of the inefficiency terms 
 
Panel translog cost frontier with fixed-effects at the bank-level. We only report the 
parametrization parameters and use the same specification of the cost function as in Table 3. In 
the parametrization of the variance, Big Five is the omitted group.  Definitions of the variables are 
provided in the methodological section. *, ** and *** denote an estimate significantly different 
from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  Transient Error Variance  Persistent Error Variance 
     
Foreign 0.533  -50.934 
 (0.78)  (-0.00) 
Joint-Stock -0.035  -0.993** 
 (-0.05)  (-2.28) 
RCB 1.103  -0.448 
 (1.59)  (-0.94) 
CCB 0.546  -0.299 
 (0.84)  (-0.67) 
Equity Ratio  -0.615  -11.008*** 
 (-0.39)  (-2.93) 
RRR 0.063  0.058 
 (1.16)  (1.35) 
Listed -0.471  -0.124 
 (-1.15)  (-0.43) 
HK Listed 0.270  -0.637* 
 (0.66)  (-1.66) 
Constant -6.275***  -3.096*** 
 (-5.00)  (-3.43) 
     
N 969  969 
No. of groups 165  165 
Log-Likelihood 772.79  578.44 










This table displays the marginal effects of the parametrized cost function. We report both the 
marginal effect of the variable on the mean and the variance of the unconditional persistent and 
transient inefficiency. A negative sign indicates a reduction of inefficiency. Margins are 
expressed in percent. We use bootstrapping approach to calculate standard errors and report the 
corresponding Z-test. Definitions of the variables are provided in the methodological section. *, 
** and *** denote significant difference at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Marginal effects on unconditional transient inefficiency  
    Effect on the mean  Effect on the variance 
  Margin Z p-value  Mean Z p-value 
Foreign    0.02 0.78 0.43  0.002 0.81 0.42 
Joint-Stock   -0.001 -0.06 0.95  0 -0.07 0.94 
RCB   0.041 0.77 0.44  0.004 1.04 0.30 
CCB   0.02 1.07 0.28  0.002 1.04 0.30 
Equity Ratio   -0.023 -0.06 0.95  -0.002 -0.08 0.94 
RRR  0.002 0.97 0.33  0 0.91 0.36 
Listed   -0.018 -1.38 0.17  -0.002 -1.39 0.17 
HK Listed   0.01 0.61 0.54  0.001 0.70 0.49 
         
Marginal effects on unconditional persistent inefficiency 
  Effect on the mean  Effect on the variance 
  Margin Z p-value  Mean Z p-value 
Foreign   -2.98*** -17.66 0.00  -0.527*** -9.41 0.00 
Joint-Stock  -0.058*** -5.18 0.00  -0.01*** -4.88 0.00 
RCB  -0.026 -1.22 0.22  -0.005 -1.25 0.21 
CCB  -0.018 -1.17 0.24  -0.003 -1.17 0.24 
Equity Ratio  -0.644*** -3.59 0.00  -0.114*** -3.41 0.00 
RRR  0.003* 1.81 0.07  0.001* 1.77 0.08 
Listed  -0.007 -1.08 0.28  -0.001 -1.07 0.29 
HK Listed  -0.037*** -3.15 0.00  -0.007*** -3.09 0.00 
         






Mean inputs - Efficiency measures 
 
This table provides the efficiency scores of the banks over the years and depending on the bank 
type. We follow Jiang et al. (2013) and use mean inputs to calculate the cost frontier and 
efficiency estimates. We follow Kumbhakar, Lien, and Hardaker (2014) and divide efficiency 
into persistent and transient parts. 
 
Years   All   Big 5 
    Overall Transient Persistent   Overall Transient Persistent 
2008   59.88% 89.13% 67.10%   20.83% 88.50% 23.52% 
2009   60.50% 89.34% 67.75%   21.16% 89.85% 23.52% 
2010   60.58% 89.46% 67.66%   21.22% 90.18% 23.52% 
2011   61.57% 89.30% 68.86%   21.08% 89.68% 23.52% 
2012   62.92% 89.30% 70.43%   20.78% 88.30% 23.52% 
2013   63.24% 89.34% 70.86%   21.08% 89.68% 23.52% 
2014   63.21% 89.22% 70.80%   21.27% 90.51% 23.52% 
2015   62.47% 89.27% 70.21%   21.31% 90.76% 23.52% 
Total   61.95% 89.29% 69.39%   21.09% 89.68% 23.52% 
                  
    Joint-Stock   Foreign 
    Overall Transient Persistent   Overall Transient Persistent 
2008   38.85% 89.69% 43.33%   70.09% 90.47% 77.21% 
2009   39.45% 91.09% 43.33%   69.99% 89.55% 77.96% 
2010   38.82% 89.50% 43.33%   70.09% 89.62% 78.16% 
2011   40.16% 89.20% 44.86%   68.32% 89.06% 76.77% 
2012   40.44% 88.91% 45.47%   67.26% 86.84% 77.47% 
2013   40.81% 89.51% 45.58%   68.25% 88.13% 77.69% 
2014   40.71% 89.63% 45.47%   70.90% 90.10% 78.81% 
2015   40.57% 89.45% 45.47%   70.25% 89.46% 78.60% 
Total   40.00% 89.61% 44.64%   69.34% 89.09% 77.85% 
                  
    CCB   RCB 
    Overall Transient Persistent   Overall Transient Persistent 
2008   63.58% 88.60% 71.79%   59.75% 88.44% 67.53% 
2009   64.77% 89.25% 72.58%   56.48% 86.67% 65.28% 
2010   63.95% 89.26% 71.56%   60.86% 89.81% 67.67% 
2011   65.46% 89.26% 73.15%   62.08% 90.15% 68.84% 
2012   67.37% 90.31% 74.62%   67.53% 91.01% 74.04% 
2013   66.04% 89.52% 73.81%   68.62% 90.21% 75.96% 
2014   65.52% 88.96% 73.37%   65.42% 88.35% 74.26% 
2015   64.78% 89.40% 72.69%   65.50% 88.19% 74.66% 






Battese and Coelli efficiency measures 
 
This table provides the efficiency scores of the banks over the years and depending on the bank type 
following Battese and Coelli (1995).  
 
  Full Sample Big5 Joint-Stock CCB RCB Foreign 
2008 89.04% 90.97% 94.06% 87.33% 86.32% 91.14% 
2009 88.42% 91.93% 93.23% 86.38% 88.70% 90.67% 
2010 88.37% 91.90% 93.26% 86.17% 91.25% 89.30% 
2011 88.66% 85.41% 91.75% 86.23% 91.81% 91.84% 
2012 90.55% 92.60% 92.62% 89.32% 88.35% 93.02% 
2013 88.39% 92.59% 91.67% 85.71% 87.89% 93.35% 
2014 87.08% 88.66% 88.88% 84.74% 89.08% 90.17% 
2015 88.81% 89.08% 89.74% 86.61% 90.94% 91.72% 







Efficiency measures  estimated by sub-periods. 
 
This table provides the efficiency scores of the banks over the years and depending on the bank 
type. We perform estimations on two sub-samples: 2008-2011, and 2012-2015. We follow 
Kumbhakar, Lien, and Hardaker (2014) and divide efficiency into persistent and transient parts. 
 
Years   All   Big 5 
    Overall Transient Persistent   Overall Transient Persistent 
2008   95.46% 95.58% 99.87%   95.13% 95.25% 99.87% 
2009   95.70% 95.82% 99.87%   96.06% 96.18% 99.87% 
2010   95.64% 95.76% 99.87%   96.21% 96.33% 99.87% 
2011   95.56% 95.68% 99.87%   95.79% 95.91% 99.87% 
2012   94.10% 94.24% 99.86%   94.37% 94.50% 99.86% 
2013   94.05% 94.18% 99.86%   95.35% 95.48% 99.86% 
2014   94.29% 94.42% 99.86%   93.75% 93.88% 99.86% 
2015   94.13% 94.26% 99.86%   94.36% 94.49% 99.86% 
    Joint-Stock   Foreign 
    Overall Transient Persistent   Overall Transient Persistent 
2008   95.94% 96.06% 99.87%  95.64% 95.76% 99.87% 
2009   95.96% 96.08% 99.87%  95.59% 95.71% 99.87% 
2010   95.87% 96.00% 99.87%  95.46% 95.58% 99.87% 
2011   95.27% 95.39% 99.87%  95.64% 95.76% 99.87% 
2012   94.11% 94.25% 99.86%  94.09% 94.22% 99.86% 
2013   94.98% 95.11% 99.86%  93.19% 93.32% 99.86% 
2014   94.31% 94.44% 99.86%  94.21% 94.34% 99.86% 
2015   94.36% 94.50% 99.86%  94.80% 94.94% 99.86% 
    CCB   RCB 
    Overall Transient Persistent   Overall Transient Persistent 
2008   95.46% 95.58% 99.87%  94.58% 94.70% 99.87% 
2009   95.73% 95.85% 99.87%  95.15% 95.27% 99.87% 
2010   95.53% 95.65% 99.87%  96.09% 96.21% 99.87% 
2011   95.45% 95.57% 99.87%  96.14% 96.26% 99.87% 
2012   94.07% 94.21% 99.86%  94.14% 94.27% 99.86% 
2013   94.14% 94.28% 99.86%  94.12% 94.25% 99.86% 
2014   94.37% 94.50% 99.86%  94.26% 94.39% 99.86% 





Overall efficiency scores 
 
 

















Persistent efficiency scores 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean persistent efficiency scores of Chinese banks by ownership type. 
